Internet-based selling offers firms many new opportunities to strategize about the mechanism designs they use to support transaction making with consumers. This article examines the use of transparency strategy for Internet-based selling as a means for the firm to maximize the value of its selling activities on the World Wide Web. We define transparency and three of its most often observed forms in this article: product transparency, price transparency and supplier transparency. In each case, transparency refers to the extent to the extent to which a seller reveals private information to the consumer. We use these three forms of transparency to evaluate consumers' responses to firm strategy with the selection of different levels of each kind of transparency in terms of willingness-to-pay. The perspective that we offer is especially relevant to the formation of strategy in the online travel agency (OTA) context. We position the theory in this illustrative context to showcase its applicability and the power of its theoretical insights in an appropriate real world context. We also generalize our findings to suggest some managerial guidelines that will help senior managers who must make transparency strategy choices in other Internet-related business contexts.
INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web has changed the business environment and competitive behavior in many industries because consumers now have more access to market information. The speed at which the Internet has revolutionized information availability and information sharing has taken managers by surprise. While many firms have failed in their effort to implement sound Internet strategies in an environment where consumers are better informed, other firms with creative strategies have succeeded. Blue Nile (www.bluenile.com), a small online jewelry store, increased sales from $14 million to $72 million over the last five years by educating the male consumer in the purchase of an engagement ring (Acohido, 2003) . See Figure 1 for an example of transparency relative to a luxury product. Also, eBay (www.ebay.com) intermediated the trade of items worth $15 billion in 2002, of which 97% were sold by small businesses or individuals. eBay's strategy is based on the premise of providing equal access to auctioneers, resulting in neutral product offers to consumers (Hansell, 2003) . Orbitz (www.orbitz.com), the airline industry consortium online travel Web site, became the market leader in the sale of airline tickets just two years after its launch in 2001, and has staked a claim as the most unbiased travel Web site in the market (Granados, et al., 2003b ).
We will argue that each of these firms has chosen a strategy-known as the level of market transparency-involving the revelation of private information to the consumer that sets their business approach apart, forming the basis for a unique value proposition. Successful strategies such as these have been the exception in Internet-based selling. The main contribution of this chapter is that it establishes a foundation for researchers and managers to develop theories and guidelines to strategize around the well-recognized increase in market information available to consumers. We discuss the following questions:
□ What is the impact of the Internet technology on consumers' access to information?
□ What transparency strategies are available to firms in Internet-based selling?
□ Can normative guidelines be developed to support a firm's decision to reveal or conceal information from consumers?
We define market transparency as the availability and accessibility of information, classified in three categories of information that may influence the economic behavior of market participants: price, product, and supplier information. We will discuss each of these categories in greater depth later in this chapter. Different types of information may induce different economic behavior on the part of consumers. To understand the impact of a firm's decision to reveal information to consumers, a certain level of specificity about the information itself is necessary. Prior research in financial markets commonly models the availability of specific information to determine how market transparency increases market efficiency or the liquidity of stocks that are traded. Pagano and Roell (1996) analyze the availability of information on quantities demanded and supplied and its impact on market structure and efficiency. And Biais (1993) takes buyer and seller quotes as indicators of market transparency.
In the context of Internet-based selling, there is a need to specify the kind of information that is provided to the consumer to assess her response to such information. As a result, we need to think through what level of specificity is appropriate to analyze the information that firms choose to reveal or conceal from consumers. We will argue that firms that use the Internet as a distribution channel should develop a transparency strategy. We introduce the concept of market transparency potential to show why the Internet has increased the ability of firms to inform consumers. This increased potential is the upper limit of the market transparency space, or the set of available options for firms to select a transparency strategy. We provide guidelines that firms can use to develop transparency strategies for Internet-based selling.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section grounds the problem in the real world scenario of online travel agencies (OTAs) that we believe have implemented different transparency strategies. Then we introduce a conceptualization of market transparency, including a definition that is appropriate for this context. Thereafter, we discuss the impact of market transparency on consumers' willingness-to-pay and the strategic implications for firms.
Finally, we use the theory that we have developed and discussed in the previous sections to analyze the above questions in the context of the OTA industry. We conclude with a review of the primary contributions of this research and some remaining issues and considerations.
TRANSPARENCY STRATEGY IN THE ONLINE TRAVEL AGENCY INDUSTRY
Internet technology has increased the flexibility to provide information to consumers. Today, with simple changes in the design of a Web site, firms can choose to explicitly reveal or conceal specific information. This has dramatically increased the possible strategies a firm can adopt in Internet-based selling. We explore the online travel agency (OTA) industry to illustrate transparency strategies in a real world context. We focus on United States airline firms and their strategies to enter the OTA market with several new selling mechanisms that exhibit different levels of market transparency. We incorporate current research and literature that informs our understanding and ability to interpret the related business problems.
Transparency Strategies in the OTA industry
Exploratory assessments that we have been conducting in an ongoing field study of OTAs and their information revelation strategies on the World Wide Web help to inform our thinking about the transparency strategies these firms are using. An important preliminary observation that we can offer is that firms have the opportunity to implement transparency strategies that typically are based on a multi-dimensional approach, rather than a focus on a single aspect (e.g., revealing price changes over time). We identify product features, price information, and supplier-related information that can be revealed or concealed, based on the choices that a firm can make about how it wishes to position itself and its products or services in the market.
Product and Supplier Transparency Strategies.
A good starting point for this discussion is the U.S. air travel industry. OTAs have emerged with novel selling mechanisms and different levels of transparency that are perceived by consumers who have adopted the Internet channel.
Of course, we often see airline ticketing Web sites owned by individual airlines (e.g., American
Airlines, www.americanairlines.com, America West Airlines, www.americawest.com, Delta Airlines, www.delta.com. and Northwest Airlines, www.nwa.com). But a number of major airlines have joined forces to launch two new OTAs that make the role of transparency strategy in the OTA clear in terms of the kinds of information that are selectively offered and held back, the positioning of the firms in the marketplace relative to consumers, and why such transparency strategy plays are suggestive of what other firms can do in other marketplaces and industries.
The first is Orbitz (www.orbitz.com), a consortium-owned OTA with involvement from American, Continental, Delta, Northwest and United Airlines, illustrates the general recognition that the marketplace needs centrally-located electronic markets that work well on behalf of most of the large competitors. Other organizational forms would be too expensive for any single player, and would not survive to equilibrium. Orbitz provides multiple combinations of itineraries, airlines, and low fares available based on a consumer's reservation request. The firm's strategy is to provide full information to the consumer regarding product and price offers. Figure 2 shows the layout of the information to the traveler in a matrix display, which provides a single-screen summary of the available options and avoids the need to scroll down.
Figure 2. Orbitz's Matrix Display As an Indicator of Market Transparency
Note: In the selling mechanism of Orbitz (www.orbitz.com), the matrix display is a one-screen summary of the travel options available, by airline, price, and number of stops. It conveys the main details of the travel arrangements that consumers are willing to pay for.
This matrix display contains hypermedia buttons to access travel itineraries of interest to the customer, such as options with the lowest prices or airline-specific alternatives. An enabler of this strategy is a state-of-the-art technology that operates behind the scenes, allowing consumers to obtain pass-through, low-cost access to airline itineraries and fares. This avoids limitations of the legacy systems associated with the global distribution systems (GDS) firms (e.g., Worldspan, www.worldspan.com, and Galileo International, www.galileo.com).
The second OTA is Hotwire (www.hotwire. In the selling mechanism of Hotwire (www.hotwire.com), consumers do not receive itinerary details or the airline name until the purchase transaction has been completed.
With the launch of these two Web sites, the airlines have effectively segmented the market by providing lower-than-average fares to consumers that are indifferent about the airline they fly and the times when they travel. Those who value this information will search for fares on Web sites, such as Orbitz's or an airline's portal, but should expect to have to pay a premium relative to what Hotwire can offer most of the time. The speed with which the airlines have succeeded in penetrating the OTA market is also notable. We mentioned earlier that it took Orbitz just two years to become the market share leader in its category. Likewise, Hotwire has surpassed Priceline.com (www.priceline.com) in sales to low-end, price-sensitive air travelers who are willing to shop for bargain fares on these less transparent websites (Mannes, 2003) .
These developments raise interesting questions regarding the appropriate transparency strategies a firm can adopt to release product and supplier information to the consumer.
Price Transparency Strategies. Priceline.com is at the low end of transparency. It conceals the airline name, itinerary, and price until the consumer makes a contract-binding bid.
In addition to the explicit concealment of product information, Priceline.com's sales mechanism is also intended to conceal information about the bidding process, which could guide consumers in the process of discovering the market price and her willingness-to-pay. The mechanism resembles a sealed-bid auction mechanism. Consumers are required to submit one bid for an airline ticket, but they do not have any information about bids for the same travel itinerary. Only until the traveler has committed to pay and if the bid is accepted, the traveler will receive the name of the airline name and the trip details such as flight times and stopovers. See Figure 4 .
Priceline.com further illustrates that the information signals that the OTA offers to the consumer depend on the design of the trading mechanism. Different kinds of information will be selectively disclosed or held back. This is analogous to the concept of market microstructure. Market microstructure specifies the characteristics of an exchange mechanism that facilitate the price discovery process by buyers and sellers (Domowitz, 1995) . It also specifies the information disclosure policies that may determine the attractiveness and long-run viabilities of an exchange (Pagano and Roell, 1996 , Biais, 1993 , Madhavan, 1996 . The finance literature on market microstructure studies the level of market transparency, which defines how much information is disclosed about the trading process (Madhavan, 2000) . Examples of relevant market information in this context include the bid-ask spread (the quotes from buyers, sellers, and intermediaries), order flow (net orders to buy and sell, which reflect demand and supply pressures), and transaction history (past transaction quantities and prices). This kind of information is essential and most useful for the price discovery process that market traders engage in. Overall, the literature in this area focuses on the price transparency dimension.
Zhu (2002) models price transparency in business-to-business (B2B) electronic markets.
He finds that sellers who are at a cost disadvantage relative to their competitors will tend to stay away from electronic marketplaces. His results suggest that the disclosure of price information not only creates price transparency but also cost transparency (also referred to by Sinha, 2000) . The latter is an indication of what inferences can be made by buyers about the cost structure of the sellers.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF MARKET TRANSPARENCY
Although much of the existing market transparency literature has concentrated on the impact of price transparency on market structure, efficiency, and liquidity, our field study of the OTA industry suggests that a more complete picture of the Internet-based selling context is needed.
Firms provide information to consumers about price, product, and supplier identity. Moreover, we believe that developing theoretical frameworks that inform our analysis of transparency strategies in Internet-based selling will be of significant use to senior managers and academic researchers who are interested in extending our understanding of how strategic positioning can be made more effective on the Internet. We now present some of our current thinking about the key concepts and background for a new theory-based framework to understand the impact of the Internet on market transparency and the alternative transparency strategies firms can employ.
Distinguishing Among Product, Price and Supplier Transparency
Product Transparency. Product transparency exists when the characteristics of the product from a supplier or suppliers are made available. Availability of information about product characteristics is very important to a consumer. Most consumers expect to see this kind of information before committing to making a purchase (Johnson and Levin, 1985) . In the Internet environment, consumers use product information to maximize such goals in their purchasing activities as product quality, comfort of the purchasing process, and the integrity of the acquired product (Keeney, 1999) . In the OTA industry, a transparent selling mechanism, such as the one offered by Orbitz, provides all itineraries and carriers for a given trip request by a consumer.
Embedded in this information will be the characteristics of the product offered, such as service quality, number of stops, layover times, and other factors.
Price Transparency. Price transparency exists when information about the trading goods and transaction process are made available, such as quotes and transaction prices. Price transparency helps a consumer assess the price at which a seller and other consumers are willing to trade, which in turn determines the consumer's willingness-to-pay. When making purchases over the Internet, consumers use pricing information to minimize cost, effort and time spent (Keeney, 1999) . The finance and market microstructure literature suggests that the level of price transparency can be understood by analyzing the mechanism that is used for trading. Generally, the more dynamic the trading mechanism (e.g., an auction mechanism, which is fully dynamic), the higher is the level of price transparency because consumers can better assess the reservation price of sellers and other consumers, as well as supply and demand forces.
In Priceline.com's selling mechanism, price transparency is low because consumers are only able to bid once and they are not aware of how much other bidders are willing to pay for the same product, or the volume of competitive bids that Priceline.com has received. In contrast, eBay offers an online auction with a dynamic trading mechanism that is novel for many settings where auctions were not possible in the past. These include low liquidity items such as used clothing. Today, because consumers can view pictures of the product, make online bids, and track the bidding process electronically, the amount of information that they have has dramatically increased, improving the transactability for low liquidity items. In addition, bidders can make multiple bids until the auction expires. Collectibles (e.g., baseball cards, porcelain dolls, rate comic books, etc.) are made more transactable in the same way.
Supplier Transparency. Supplier transparency refers to the availability of information about suppliers, such as identity, inventory availability, shipping costs, and on-time delivery performance. Supplier identity provides clues about product or service quality and motivation that the seller will have for trading or selling it. A supplier's reputation is a key piece of information that most buyers believe can help them to make a decision about whether it is appropriate to enter into a transaction with the seller. On the other hand, inventory availability provides clues about the opportunity costs and the likely reservation prices of the supplier. Cost transparency, as we previously noted, also provides clues about the seller's reservation price.
Notice that our transparency strategy categories distinguish between product and other types of information. We recognize the diversity in the information needs of consumers that must be met by the seller to make the consumer willing to purchase. For example, with luxury items consumers may be most interested in product characteristics, while in other scenarios such as commodity markets, market price information is more relevant information to make a purchase decision (Bakos, 1997) . Related research deals with how consumers think about buying on the Internet and their information foraging behavior (Hahn and Kauffman, 2002) .
Market Transparency Potential
To understand technology-driven changes in market transparency, it is important to acknowledge that technology itself does not cause these changes, it is the market participants that enable this technology for information revelation and trading. Therefore, market participants make conscious choices to reveal or conceal information when they decide (individually or jointly) to implement a technology. Nevertheless, technology creates the potential for market transparency to exist. We define market transparency potential as the closest point to full transparency that can be achieved in a given market setting.
The U.S. airline industry, as we have already suggested, is a case in point. Prior to the Internet era, airlines and travel agencies used electronic systems called computer reservations systems (CRSs) to share information about product offers and prices offered by the airlines.
This information was used to inform consumers about available options for travel, as well as support the completion of purchase transactions. Consumers had little access to this information and depended on physical travel agencies to get it. With the advent of Internet's Web browser technology, OTA electronic intermediaries emerged to extract information from the CRSs and offer it to consumers. They provided consumers of air travel services with a way to complete their purchase transactions electronically. The airlines soon reacted by developing online travel portals offering their products (Granados, et al., 2003b) .
Market transparency potential depends on the distribution channel and technology used to sell or trade a product. Different channels (and within channels different technologies) can be distinguished by the different levels of market transparency that are possible. Our analysis focuses on transparency in technology-driven channels, where electronic trading and electronic communication prevail. Internet-based selling is especially interesting because it offers firms the opportunity to implement different kinds of transparency strategies that provide the firm with high flexibility to adapt to different kinds of market environments.
Regarding product transparency, the more digital are the characteristics of a product (up to the point where the product becomes a pure information product), the higher is the potential for product transparency when the product is traded electronically (Lal and Sarvary, 2003) . We observe that goods that have digital characteristics typically will have a higher market transparency potential. For example, airline tickets (even though the airplane and the seat that carry an air traveler from origin to destination are physical) are information-based products. This is true for movie tickets, rental car and hotel bookings too. They all can be described electronically better than other goods such as food, clothes, or tax consulting services. Most goods have a combination of digital and non-digital characteristics, but the higher the degree of digital characteristics, the higher will be the potential for product transparency in electronic markets. Subramani and Walden (2001) have observed that
Internet firms that announce new strategic initiatives tend to achieve abnormally higher short-term returns when their initiatives involve digital goods. Kauffman and Wang (2003) have shown that Internet firms are also more likely survive when they pursue strategies involving the sale of digital goods rather than physical ones, or when they act as electronic intermediaries. Conversely, the greater the extent of non-digital characteristics, the higher will be the potential to sell the product in channels where physical inspection or live demonstrations are possible and will create value for the consumer. Subramani and Walden (2001) and Kauffman and Wang (2003) note the lower market valuation and lower rate of survival of this kind of Internet firm, respectively.
The literature on financial market microstructure suggests that market mechanisms that generate more information about a trading process have a higher potential for price transparency. Furthermore, the more dynamic the trading process, the higher is the potential for price transparency. Static markets are those where a firm publishes prices and changes occur as relatively discrete and sometimes even fairly rare events. Dynamic markets have prices that change constantly based on demand-supply pressures, such as in double auctions, where both buyers and sellers can influence transaction prices for a single trade. With some exceptions, the more dynamic the process of price-setting in a market, the more information related to prices is potentially available to its participants.
We propose a framework that classifies market transparency potential on the Internet based on product characteristics and market microstructure. (See Figure 5 .) Industries can be positioned in this framework based on the product characteristics and the trading mechanism. This approximates the industry's market transparency potential overall. For example, at the low end are tangible goods such as food and clothes, which by their nature cannot be easily described in the Internet (e.g., how they taste, or how they feel to the touch).
At the high end of market transparency potential are financial securities, information goods that commonly are traded in dynamic markets such as auction or dealer markets.
Figure 5. Market Transparency Potential in Electronic Markets on the Internet
Note: The higher the digital characteristics of product, the higher the product transparency potential. Also, the more dynamic the market mechanism, the higher is the price transparency potential. Firms will be unable to make choices of transparency strategies that have a greater degree of price or product transparency in Internet-based selling than the combination that characterizes an industry's market transparency potential.
Market Transparency Strategy Space
Electronic market and Internet-based selling technologies have not only increased the market transparency potential in many industries. They also have expanded the possible set of strategic . .
Non-digital Dynamic
Market Microstructure alternatives possessed by firms. Before the Internet era, most firms were subject to the market structure and mechanisms that were not able to bear as much market transparency potential. In the airline industry, the dominant channel for making airline ticket reservations involved legacy CRS technologies at physical travel agencies. Today, however, firms in many industries firms can now select the level of market transparency with which they will compete. In terms of the framework in Figure 5 , firms are able to select almost any point in the space inside the market transparency potential of the respective industry. By "inside," we mean points that are to either below and to the left of any industry's product transparency-price transparency combination that defines its market transparency potential, or both.
The representation of this concept is what we call a market transparency space. By adding the supplier transparency dimension that we discussed to this space, we form a three-dimensional space of transparency strategies that a firm can adopt. The different types of OTAs can be placed in a market transparency space relative to each other, as the reader should see in Figure 6 . In the market transparency space of the OTA industry, Orbitz has positioned itself closest to the market transparency potential. We determine this through our evaluation of its matrix display, which offers complete product, supplier, and price information. Below Orbitz in market transparency are the airline portals, which offer fewer travel options, limited only to those of the portal site airline and its code-sharing partners.
Priceline.com and Hotwire exhibit the lowest levels of product transparency. They both fall short in supplier transparency because, prior to the consumer's purchase transaction, they conceal the airline name. Priceline is to the left of Hotwire in the market transparency space Our definition of market transparency fits the strategy choice problem that firms face about whether to reveal or conceal information in Internet-based selling. We offered definitions for three different types of market transparency: product transparency, price transparency, and supplier transparency. We introduced the concept of market transparency potential to help the reader to understand how electronic markets tend to increase the maximum level of market transparency that is available to sellers. We also introduced the idea of a market transparency space. We characterized this as all the possible transparency strategies a firm can adopt, bounded by the maximum or potential for a specific kind of transparency in an industry. This is due to the nature of its products and its mercantile exchange mechanisms. Our conceptualization sets the stage for researchers to achieve a more complete understanding of transparency strategy.
TRANSPARENCY STRATEGIES IN INTERNET-BASED SELLING
We will next use the theoretical foundations that we have just presented to develop guidelines for firm adoption of an appropriate transparency strategy. In the presence of information asymmetry, sellers are uncertain about the willingness-to-pay of consumers.
Different forms market transparency, in our view, can influence the willingness-to-pay of consumers, and the implications for a firm's strategy choice of market transparency with respect to the market transparency triple.
Are Consumers Willing to Pay for Market Transparency?
An increase in market transparency is associated with a decrease in the costs of information search and, consequently, it also tends to increase consumers' willingness-to-pay. The rationale is as follows. When firms use electronic markets to disclose information to consumers, in effect, they are saving consumers the cost of discovering or finding this information on their own. This results in higher consumer surplus (Bakos, 1997) . We call this the direct effect of market transparency on consumer surplus. In addition, there are also indirect effects on consumer surplus, related to the incremental benefits of receiving new market information. Hence, increased expectations of surplus on the part of consumers will result in higher levels of willingness-to-pay. We explore this rationale in more detail below in the context of product, price, and supplier transparency. Note: Empirical research is necessary to determine whether consumers do, in fact, respond to increased levels of market transparency in the ways that we describe here. Nevertheless, the point is this: by understanding the way in which willingness-to-pay is influenced by changes in market transparency, firms will be in a better position to decide what the best market transparency strategy may be to maximize profits.
Product Transparency and Willingness-to-Pay
Product transparency can have an impact on willingness-to-pay in two ways also: direct and indirect effects. In addition to the search cost benefits, product transparency allows the consumer to discern product benefits and shortcomings with higher precision, which may result in more accurate product valuation by the consumer (Harbrouck, 1995) . Akerlof's (1970) well known parable of the market for lemons illustrates how an increase in product transparency can increase consumer surplus. Akerlof showed that a market for a product may fail if customers are less informed about product characteristics and quality than suppliers. Hence, the opposite also applies. If consumers are aware of product quality their surplus ought to increase.
The impact of product transparency on willingness-to-pay in Internet-based selling is well illustrated by the OTA example. In the fare search shown in Figure 2 presented earlier, Orbitz offers 233 different itineraries for a reservation request for a round trip between Minneapolis and San Francisco. Because Orbitz offers more information about alternatives for travel, consumers will utilize this Web site to search for information to reduce their search costs, a direct effect.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the consumer will purchase the ticket from Orbitz. may be willing to pay a premium when purchasing on Orbitz in order to find a better match to its travel needs. This is an illustration of the indirect effect. Notice that the indirect effect of market transparency tends to induce purchase more so than the direct effect, because it provides incremental value to the consumer beyond the reduction of search costs. In the OTA industry, the direct effect of product transparency gives consumers the incentive to perform multi-Web site and multi-channel search before purchasing an airline ticket. Industry research has found that 70% and 90% of air travelers search more than one Web site before purchasing a ticket (Forrester, 1999; Regan, 2001 Granados, Gupta and Kauffman (2003a) . The assumptions that underlie the model that produced these findings are as follows: two firms, perfect competition, linear demand, short-term horizon and low marginal costs.
Price Transparency and Willingness-to-Pay
Several studies and analyses in the economics and IS literature suggest that price transparency may reduce willingness-to-pay. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) report that in business-to-consumer (B2C) markets some retailers charge low prices to attract informed consumers, while others charge high prices which less well-informed consumers end up having to pay. Wise and Morrison (2000) suggest that even though the Internet has brought higher liquidity and transparency, sellers have little incentive to participate due to the risk of price pressures. This is especially true, for example, in buyer-focused electronic markets for supply chain management and procurement services, where suppliers suffer from the negative externalities of increasingly intense participation-driven cross-competition (Dai and Kauffman, 2003) . More generally, Stigler (1961) showed that a lower price may result if search costs are reduced and a lower market price is discovered.
The economic rationale for this can also be understood in terms of the direct and indirect effects. Regarding the direct effect, in interviews with airline executives, we have received consistent signals that the direct effect of price transparency-lower search costs for cheaper alternatives-is reducing the prices of tickets when consumers purchase online compared to other channels. Regarding the indirect effect, in a transaction-making environment with asymmetric information, buyers are uncertain about sellers' opportunity costs. But now, as Zhu (2002) recognized for B2B e-markets, consumers can better estimate of the sellers' opportunity cost with higher price transparency. In addition, the market microstructure literature suggests that dynamic market mechanisms have the capacity to provide higher price transparency.
Interpreting what we see more broadly, it appears that more dynamic market mechanisms will tend to lower willingness-to-pay compared to static markets with posted prices. This is in line with eBay's June 2003 report that customers are more informed about prices, which has resulted in a more efficient marketplace but "compressed margins" (Hansell, 2003) . Therefore, the direct and indirect effects of price transparency create simultaneous downward pressure on willingness-to-pay.
Supplier Transparency and Willingness-to-Pay
Supplier transparency may have two opposite effects on willingness-to-pay, depending on the information that is made available. First, identity of the seller increases the willingness-to-pay, similar to what we concluded about the indirect effect of product transparency, since seller identity includes signals about product quality. For example, in the sale of airline tickets, availability of information about the carrier provides signals about the quality of the product (e.g., safety, reliability and on-board service). These signals of product characteristics allow consumers to make a better valuation of the product to find one the best matches her needs.
Second, inventory availability and cost transparency reduce maximum willingness-to-pay, similar to what we claimed was the indirect effect of price transparency. The reasoning is that consumers are better able to ascertain the production and opportunity costs of a seller, and the consequent reservation price of the seller. This is analogous to knowing the bid-ask spread of a market-making intermediary in the sale of stocks or bonds in the financial services industry. By being able to assess the trading margin of sellers, the willingness-to-pay of consumers will decrease to minimize the sellers' margins.
Market Transparency Indifference Curves
Our analysis so far involves the separate impact of different types of market transparency on consumers' willingness-to-pay. However, firms commonly make joint decisions to disclose product, price, and supplier information. In other words, movements to define the firm's transparency strategy in an industry's market transparency space may involve adjustments in more than one transparency dimension. Based on the likely impacts of market transparency on willingness-to-pay that we have discussed, we will next try to characterize the impact of these joint decisions by introducing the concept of market transparency indifference curves. For the sake of expositional clarity, we will focus our analysis on the indifference curves for the product and price transparency, and leave supplier transparency aside for the moment.
The decisions firms face to reveal or conceal information depend on their impact on consumers' economic behavior, assuming that the marginal costs of providing different types of transparency are the same. If we assume that product transparency tends to increase willingnessto-pay and price transparency tends to decrease willingness-to-pay, a seller's indifference curve between product and price information should be an increasing function. In other words, if an increase in price transparency decreases consumers' willingness-to-pay, the seller must increase product transparency to offset the negative effect of price transparency and be indifferent. This provides the beginnings of policy guidance for making transparency strategy decisions.
To deepen the managerial insights that this preliminary analysis yields, it is important to explore the impacts based on the shape of the seller's indifference curves. The curves can be concave, convex or linear, with each implying somewhat different underlying tradeoff relationships. Assessing the tradeoffs poses difficult managerial questions because it is not easy to compare the benefits of making product information available versus making price information available. For example, if an OTA is deciding whether to conceal the airline name from the consumer as part of its transaction-making mechanism, then what pricing information should be made available in order to offset the negative impact of a decision to conceal it? And how will that compare with a decision to conceal the number of stops in the travel itinerary? It should be clear to the reader that this question will require a more complex analysis, and so we leave it for future research. But it is nevertheless important to point out that the design of an appropriate transparency strategy will involve answering questions such as these.
What happens if the marginal return of an increase in product transparency can be more than offset by a similar decrease in price transparency? This is especially the case in financial markets, where pricing information carries valuable signals associated with market efficiency.
Investors are likely to be more sensitive to a change in price transparency than they are to changes in product transparency. This financial markets example also suggests that there may be a point in the market transparency space with high price transparency where less product transparency is necessary. Many traders operate based on observations of price fluctuations with only the basic product information considered (e.g., financial ratios, earnings per share, etc.). There is a diminishing return to the availability of product information such that with very high price transparency, product information becomes almost irrelevant. This suggests that in the market transparency space the form of the indifference curve will be concave. In addition, the curve is likely to be strictly concave if information overload about price can occur, such that at some point in the market transparency space, due to price information overload, price transparency has a negative effect on consumers' willingness-to-pay.
Regarding the consumer's indifference curve, consumers value both product and price information, so their indifference curves will have a negative slope. In other words, a decrease in price transparency must be offset by an increase in product transparency for the consumer to be indifferent. At a point of high price transparency, as observed in financial markets, pricing information suffices and investors are satisfied with a fixed set of product information. Assume this indifference curve is strictly convex. Figure 7 depicts the indifference curves for firms and consumers in the market transparency space. This representation suggests an efficiency frontier in the market transparency space, with many possible equilibrium points where both sellers and consumers are able to maximize their payoffs. Notice that the efficiency frontier occurs at a point of relatively high price transparency. This can partially explain why, in financial markets where dynamic market mechanisms prevail, electronic market structures can be built and will be sustained in their operation for a long period of time as the prevailing trading mechanism in a region or for a specific type of security (e.g,. the
New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or the London Stock Exchange). In contrast, in other markets where posted prices prevail, multiple electronic markets with different levels of market transparency are more likely to be found. An example is the airline industry. OTAs have adopted multiple kinds of market mechanisms in the market transparency space, attracting consumers with diverse market transparency preferences, as we showed in Figure 6 . But this may also partially explain why, by bringing more dynamic market mechanisms to B2C markets, auction models, such as the one used by eBay, have been successful since the early stages of ecommerce. eBay's high price transparency tends to satisfy both sellers and buyers, such that product characteristics take a second priority. However, Kauffman and Wood (2004) find that the inclusion of a picture with the description of an auction item on eBay tends to increase a buyer's willingness-to-pay.
In summary, we have analyzed the possible consequences of product, price, and supplier transparency on consumers' willingness-to-pay. Generally, a positive impact on willingness-topay favors the seller, so a firm should try to induce higher willingness-to-pay with its transparency strategy. We suggest that product transparency reduces search costs for product information, such that there are positive direct and indirect effects of product transparency on willingness-to-pay. In contrast, price transparency has negative direct and indirect effects on willingness-to-pay. The results for supplier transparency are mixed, depending on the type of information revealed. We also noted that firms may be indifferent among transparency strategies, and we proposed a means to analyze this via market transparency indifference curves.
This offers a first indication regarding the impact of transparency strategy decisions that move a firm along more than one dimension in the market transparency space.
FURTHER APPLICATION OF THE THEORY TO THE ONLINE TRAVEL INDUSTRY
In this section we take the research questions introduced at the beginning of this chapter and briefly analyze the OTA industry in the context of the theory of market transparency in Internetbased selling presented in the previous sections.
Impact of Internet Technology on Market Transparency Potential
The first question is related to the impact of Internet technology on market transparency. In the OTA industry, consumers have a lot more access to travel-related information than before. If the assumptions that both product and price transparency are valued by the consumer, the OTA industry likely contributes to a higher level of market efficiency where consumers are better able to find the right travel option that satisfies their needs. However, the result for the sellers is less promising in two ways. First, increased levels of market transparency by OTAs put downward pressure on the profits of traditional intermediaries such as travel agencies. Theory of intermediation suggests that the returns to intermediation between suppliers and buyers are higher when search is more costly (Spulber, 1999) . Therefore, increased market transparency potential threatens the position of travel agencies in the market structure of air travel distribution.
Second, based on the assumption that an increase in price transparency has a higher negative effect on consumers' willingness-to-pay than a similar increase in product transparency, there is downward pressure on air travel fares as smarter consumers are able to find lower fares and to ascertain the airline's opportunity costs. Our interviews with airline executives point in that direction. Further analysis of the impact of market transparency potential due to the Internet is necessary to support this assessment. For example, economic models of the airline industry can be developed where market transparency is a parameter that influences consumer demand.
The Market Transparency Space in Internet-Based Selling
In Internet-based selling, OTAs have the flexibility to reveal or conceal information about the product and the supplier in multiple ways, based on the information revealed or concealed and the design of the trading mechanism. Table 3 illustrates market transparency dimensions in the OTA industry, based on the information that can be provided to consumers. The table shows the numerous options and combinations that OTAs can select, which shows the explosion of alternatives that firms are faced with when trying to select a transparency strategy. 
Transparency Strategy Guidelines for Online Travel Agencies
With the theoretical development from above, firms can perform a competitive analysis of where they stand relative to the competition in the market transparency space. Given the current options for market transparency in the air travel booking industry, are the OTAs implementing sound transparency strategies? Granados, Gupta, and Kauffman (2003b) (Morrison and Winston, 1996) , which typically causes homogeneous pricing for a given fare type, origin destination, and travel date. The consequence is that consumers tend to prefer Orbitz because its prices are comparable (and sometimes lower) than those posted by other OTAs, based on Orbitz's choice of a very transparent market mechanism. This may explain why Orbitz moved into a position of market leadership so rapidly.
This price-matching environment where there are multiple market transparency selling mechanisms has serious implications for firms with a low market transparency strategy.
Generally, to compensate for a lower market transparency, Orbitz's rivals should be offering lower prices, if they wish to appeal to the same segments of the air travel consumer marketplace.
However, in practice, it is difficult to generate price discounts for the consumer that will attract them to less transparent Web sites. The most representative example is Priceline.com. Its mechanism is the least transparent because it only provides product and price information to a bidding consumer once the consumer has made a contract binding bid. Therefore, it is at risk of losing customers to more transparent OTAs, especially to Hotwire, which targets similarly pricesensitive consumers who are willing to forego product transparency to get a better price. To compensate for the lower level of market transparency, Priceline.com needs to offer incentives to consumers to attract them. The most tangible offer is that of lower prices or special deals. In the price-matching environment of the U.S. airline industry, this has proven to be difficult for Priceline.com. Legg Mason analyst, Thomas Underwood, has reported that Priceline.com is bigger and has been more profitable than Hotwire. In addition, the latter is growing more rapidly (Mannes, 2003) .
1 This may partially explain why Hotwire has passed Priceline.com in the number of new user adoptions just one year after its launch Meanwhile, Priceline.com has chosen to limit transparency regarding product information, which puts it in a somewhat disadvantageous competitive position going forward.
Another interesting contrast is between Orbitz and Hotwire, the industry consortium OTAs.
The airline firms reintermediated the OTA industry with Orbitz and Hotwire. The OTA industry was increasingly characterized by non-airline, third party entrants, including Microsoft's Expedia (www.expedia.com), E-Travel.com (www.e-travel.com), GetThere (www.getthere.com), and Travelocity (www.travelocity.com), among others. They effectively segmented the market with two different market mechanisms, one with a high level of transparency and one with a low level of transparency. Consumers that value information about the airline and their travel itinerary are more likely to be traveling for business or scheduled meetings, so they are likely to purchase on Orbitz. In contrast, price-sensitive leisure travelers are willing to purchase on Hotwire or
Priceline.com because they are less concerned about the airline they fly or the specific travel times. So, by leveraging consumers' self-selection, airlines can price discriminate, segment the market, and offer lower prices with less risk of adverse selection or retaliation by competitors.
In summary, OTAs have multiple options to implement transparency strategies. However, due to the technological superiority of Orbitz, other OTAs are now experiencing increased pressure to adjust their transparency strategy choices in the market transparency space in order to maintain market share. In addition, the option to compensate consumers with lower prices due to lower market transparency is difficult because of the price-matching environment of the industry.
The exclusive contracts that Orbitz has to publish the lowest market prices of other airlines and
OTAs increases the pressures felt by competitors. So we conclude that the less transparent
OTAs are now faced with thinking through how they can make the best of a relatively disadvantageous position in market transparency strategy terms.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, we review the contributions of our theoretical exploration of transparency strategy in Internet-based selling, point out some remaining issues, and suggest some next steps.
Primary Contributions
We presented a new market transparency theory in Internet-based selling, with a focus on the consumer's perspective and the implications for firm strategy. We provided insights into consumers' possible responses to changes in market transparency levels and the consequences for organizational strategy. Increasingly, organizations are finding that the information they previously owned or had privileged access to is being shared electronically. Consumers have access to much more information than ever before. We introduced market transparency potential to conceptualize how IT can increase the ability of firms to strategize about the information to reveal or conceal from consumers. The outcomes that we have observed in the OTA industry suggest that the dynamics of the competition is changing dramatically. We call for additional research on the impact of market transparency on firm strategy and industrial organization.
This chapter provides a basis for future research in market transparency in Internet-based selling. We explored the possible consequences of market transparency on consumers'
willingness-to-pay, with the recognition that different information may have direct and indirect effects on willingness-to-pay by reducing search costs. Firms with a high level of market transparency may have an advantage in attracting consumers to search on their Web sites, which is indicative of the direct effect. When firms that implement mercantile exchange mechanisms with a high level of product transparency enable consumers to make more accurate valuations of the product, increasing their willingness-to-pay, we see indications of the indirect effect. Mercantile exchange mechanisms with lower levels of transparency attract consumers that are less concerned about product characteristics and that may be willing to give up product transparency for a lower price. This suggests that pricing and transparency strategy must be closely aligned to ensure that firms are not at a disadvantage relative to competitors with a higher level of market transparency.
Remaining Issues and Next Steps
It is important to recognize that market transparency to the consumer commonly implies market transparency to competitors. If consumers are able to view the information that a firm uses in selling its goods and services, then its competitors normally will be able to view this information and take strategic decisions relative to it. So, in addition to the linked decisions that firms will face in deciding about what levels of product, price and supplier transparency are appropriate, there is also a concern about what will happen when this information is made available to competitors. Although we have not covered the implications of these additional aspects in this chapter and further analysis, we recognize that further research is necessary to uncover the mixed impact of market transparency to consumers and to competitors.
Our theoretical development of market transparency suggests a call for research to confirm some of the exploratory aspects of this analysis. For example, what is the collective impact of product, price, and supplier transparency on willingness-to-pay? While we derived the possible relationship between transparency and willingness-to-pay based on current literature about the impact of search costs on consumer surplus and willingness-to-pay in a trading environment with asymmetric information, there is a need to empirically determine these relationships, so we will come to know more about them. Econometric analysis of consumer demand under different market transparency environments can be performed to derive the relationship between market transparency and willingness-to-pay. Also, economic experiments can be performed to compare market mechanisms with different designs and levels of market transparency, to derive the impact of these differences on consumers' economic behavior. Clearly, there is much left to do in pursuing this research agenda, but it will be likely that the outcomes of such research can inform senior managers in a variety of industry, as well as researchers in economics, marketing science, IS and e-commerce.
